European Union, and criminal, laws had been interacting in many ways even before explicit competence in criminal matters was acquired by the Union in the Treaty of Maastricht. Such intersections between supranational and national provisions have frequently been handled by the CJEU. In the main, the intervention of the Court is triggered by Member States' recourse to penal sanctions in situations covered by EU law.
Introduction
European Union (EU) I law is not just a framework of coexisting watertight areas. Quite the opposite, it is a 'whole' whose constituent parts are highly connected and influence each other. As time has gone by, many bricks have built up and strengthened such a connection, with the Court of Justice of the European Union ('the Court' or the 'CJEU') playing a major role in this respect. This paper aims to put another brick in this 'whole', and to discuss how the Court's case-law on free movement can improve fundamental rights' protection in EU criminal law. By EU criminal law, I mean: the instruments adopted by the Union according to the competences conferred in the Treaty, II as well as the law of the former 'third pillar'; the interaction between EU and national criminal law.
Interdependence is an inherent feature in the EU; where interaction takes place not only among the different areas of Union law, but also between the latter and national systems. This is even truer as far as penal law is concerned. Many principles usually traced back to EU criminal law have been firstly stated and developed in the context of free movement. What is more, in many cases this has resulted in heightening the standard of protection of individual rights. Three different expressions of interaction can be seen here. III Firstly, the impact of EU law on Member States' (MS) law has concerned the infringements of EU law provisions, criminalised at national level, where the CJEU has set aside those MS' rules that limited the rights established by EU law in a disproportionate manner.
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In the third way of interaction, criminal law principles have been regarded as general principles of EU law, particularly in order to ensure the application of Union law in compliance with the principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity in criminal proceedings. VI The Treaty of Lisbon has resulted in the enhancement of the potential in terms of mutual impact among the different areas of EU law; which can be mostly ascribed to the collapse of the pillar-based structure of the EU.
In this respect, the existing case-law of the Court offers further opportunities to strengthen the protection of individuals in EU criminal law through the use of the principles stated in the context of free movement. Broadly speaking, the interplay between criminal law and free movement has increased at the EU level over the years, with two broad fronts of interaction emerging in particular. On the one hand, we have seen the use of the legal rules, and their interpretation by the CJEU, where criminal law is overtly resorted to. In the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), criminal law is explicitly used in EU instruments since the Union has specific competences in this respect. On the other hand, there are extensive areas of EU law where criminal law is not mentioned, since this would fall outside the Union powers; this is the case of the internal market and fundamental freedoms. In this way penal rules are put under the spotlight by the interaction between EU and national laws, with the Court deliberating on the role attached to criminal penalties.
The high relevance of the interaction between fundamental freedoms (or, more broadly, Union law) and criminal law has been extensively analysed. VII Indeed, free movement has been, and is, the core of EU law since the latter was born, though many other areas have been gaining ground over the years (such as citizenship and criminal law).
Right from the establishment of the EU, national provisions of criminal law have been increasingly covered by the law of the four freedoms (consisting of the Treaty and secondary law). Thereby, the chance for both kinds of rules (national and supranational) to interact has significantly heightened. Such dynamics have triggered many interpretative dilemmas, the resolution of which have been referred to the CJEU by national judges. In these contexts, the CJEU has been asked to find an equilibrium between economic freedoms and state sovereignty in criminal law. Two fundamental questions arise in this respect: is criminal law restricting, or capable of restricting, a fundamental freedom; and if so, may such a restriction be allowed? 
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Many studies have focused on the use of general principles by the CJEU in this area, VIII and its impact on criminal law. Therefore, in this paper I discuss possible consequences for EU criminal law that have not been explored in-depth so far. I select a restricted number of Court's rulings, and outline two main scenarios. As for the choice of the judgments, a key criterion has been the value of primary law taken on by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU or the Charter). I am interested in dealing with the possible impact of free movement case-law on fundamental rights in EU criminal law. Therefore, I
analyse those judgments explicitly referring to a fundamental right or a general principle now enshrined in the Charter.
The first scenario regards the use of the principle of proportionality; here I argue that the CJEU's use of the principle where criminal law encounters the fundamental freedoms has been largely beneficial to individuals. Such interactions have given the Court the opportunity to develop a manifold application of the principle of proportionality to criminal penalties featured at the national level. In this part I present the cases of Skanavi IX and Awoyemi. X As mentioned above, there is an extensive case-law of the Court's limitation of MS's use of criminal penalties in light of the principle of proportionality. Such a restraint has often been based on the argument that the measure in question was so disproportionate that it hampered the exercise of free movement. I decided to focus on Skanavi and Awoyemi as they examined exactly the same situation (driving in a host Member
State with a non-recognised licence) and the same penalty (criminal sanctions, in particular imprisonment and a fine). The only difference lies in that Mrs Skanavi was an EU national, while Mr Awoyemi was not. Therefore, I jointly read these two decisions to contrast the differences between the proportionality test applied by the Court to an EU citizen, and that applied to a third-country national.
From this, I stress the importance of EU citizenship to the application of proportionality in criminal law. Admittedly, these judgments were issued before the adoption of the Charter; however, the CFREU now provides for the universal principle of proportionality of penalties in Article 49(3 E -7 can be highly relevant to mutual recognition in criminal matters. Lastly, I recall the topics touched upon, and I argue that the case-law of the CJEU can be used to enhance protection of individuals.
EU Citizenship and Proportionality

Skanavi and Awoyemi
The question in Skanavi arose in the context of criminal proceedings against Mrs Skanavi and her husband, Mr Chryssanthakopoulos, who were charged with driving without a licence. According to German Law, the conduct was an offence punishable by imprisonment or a fine. As far as EU law is concerned, driving licences were first 
E -8
The Court was further asked whether the Treaty precluded the act of driving of a motor vehicle by a person who had not exchanged licences from being treated as driving without a licence, and thus rendered punishable by imprisonment or a fine. The Court acknowledged that the obligation to exchange the licence was compatible with EU law, but also that it constituted a mere administrative requirement.
Though the MS remain competent with regard to the use of criminal law, the latter must be used in such a way as not to obstruct free movement. This is especially the case when it comes to imprisonment, XVI where on that ground the CJEU ruled that EU law prohibited MS from treating driving without the exchanging of the licence as a criminal offence, since it would jeopardise the enjoyment of free movement. 
Impact in Terms of Proportionality
The cases discussed above are highly relevant to EU criminal law, and they are also interesting because judgements were given when the Charter did not have legally-binding value. Therefore, it is appropriate to raise the question as to how the principle stated therein can be upheld in the EU legal framework as developed by the Treaty of Lisbon. At stake there is in particular the interaction between different understandings of the principle of proportionality. As is well-known, that principle has been used to balance (inter alia) fundamental freedoms and national laws. Eminent scholars have debated on the principle of proportionality in general terms, XXI as well as with particular reference to EU law. XXII In the latter area, it has been highlighted that the multiform application of proportionality depends on the peculiarities of the area of law at stake, and the nature of the interests involved.
XXIII
As provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty of EU (TEU), proportionality is a polestar (jointly with the principle of subsidiarity) for the Union in the application of its competences. The proportionality test famously provides that: the means adopted are appropriate to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued (suitability test); the means adopted are necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued (necessity test); and the means adopted should not impose an excessive burden on the individual (proportionality stricto sensu). Put simply, the principle of proportionality under EU law requires that a legitimate aim be pursued through the least intrusive measure for individuals. Furthermore, Article 52 CFREU states that limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter are subject to the principle of proportionality. In this sense, evaluating criminal law on the basis of this principle of proportionality is to examine how the MS justify their use of criminal law, and more specifically, how criminal law is related to a given objective, and which function the former is supposed to fulfil.
However, this principle has also a criminal law understanding. E -10 the meaning of these principles is huge, I can just try to simplify it for the purposes of this paper. The interaction between the meanings of proportionality and subsidiarity in EU law and (EU) criminal law is highly relevant. As they can overlap and be understood in more than one way, their interaction can significantly impact on the individuals concerned.
Subsidiarity in criminal law (also known as ultima ratio or last resort principle) means that penal sanctions should be resorted to only where other instruments would be insufficient to protect the interests at stake. This is the outer dimension of ultima ratio, XXVII which looks at criminal law in relation to other less intrusive legislative means. As Husak states, it focuses on the alternatives to punishment, rather than on what kind of punishment to prefer and alternative means of punishment.
XXVIII
In this sense, Giudicelli-Delage argued that the necessity under EU law proportionality test is imbued not only with a utilitarian logic (relation between means and end), but also with the principle of criminal law as ultima ratio. Therefore, such a necessity would cover two fundamental guarantees: punishing "as long as it is useful and as long as it is fair. The legitimacy of punishment rests on its fairness and usefulness. The combination of these two principles is key to establishing conditions and limits of punishment (…), since considering both of them in isolation would lead to dangerous consequences". 
XXXI
The Court's judgments in Skanavi and Awoyemi show exactly the importance of these different understandings. In the cases, the application of the principle of proportionality has been linked to the entitlement to free movement, which applies to persons satisfying the following conditions: being an EU citizen; having moved to another MS; having been, or being engaged in some economic activity in the MS where s/he has moved to. The reach of the Treaty freedoms is expanded to include covering the driving licence system.
As such the protection offered by free movement law is significantly enhanced, so that the compatibility of criminal sanctions with EU law is tested in light of this enlarged dimension. The consequence is evident: the broader the area within which criminal law is E -11 required to be consistent, the higher the chances that it will be found not in compliance with EU law. Personal liberty might have been treated as an instrument for the purposes of exercising an economic freedom. More than one question arises in this respect: are there penalties which are disproportionate while not hindering free movement, and if so, how could they be justified? However, one should not overlook that in cases such as those discussed, the Court ruled on the compliance of a national measure with Treaty freedoms, so that the latter are assumed as a benchmark of lawfulness. Furthermore, in a way the CJEU is deciding on the fairness of a national criminal law system, in a moment where a (weak) Union competence in criminal matters had just come into being.
Nonetheless, such an approach may have its drawbacks, as seen in Awoyemi; in this case the Court was true to the general principle according to which the free movement law applies only to EU citizens, so that an individual may be subject to a penalty which the Court has explicitly recognised as disproportionate, if applied to EU citizens. One may uphold the CJEU coherence as follows; a criminal penalty is disproportionate where related to the exercise of free movement, that sanction ceases to be disproportionate, when applied to a person not entitled to free movement.
Granted, there are at least two elements that must be considered in the analysis of the case. Firstly, at that time the Charter had not yet been adopted. Secondly, the Court might have opted for that interpretation because there were no elements capable of triggering the application of EU law. Indeed, at stake there was the protection of the exercise of free movement. The principle of free movement could not apply, because in that case Mr
Awoyemi fell outside the scope of EU law: neither the Treaty, nor secondary law, governed that situation.
That said, it must be pointed out that there was relevant EU law in the area, namely
Directive 91/439/EEC, confirmed by the fact that the Court resorted to it when applying the principle of retroactivity of more favourable provisions of criminal law. However, it was not considered a matter of EU law because the person concerned did not enjoy free movement.
The main problem in upholding such a hands-off approach is that it takes for granted the link between the application of the principle of proportionality and the entitlement to free movement. Indeed, the Court found that the penalty was lawful, and proportionality did not apply exactly, because that principle was subject to the exercise of free movement.
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This caveat notwithstanding, I submit that Awoyemi should be regarded as a case on the proportionality of penalties, rather than a case on the application of free movement.
The advent of legally-binding value with the CFREU seems to corroborate such an interpretation. If the Court were to be asked the same question today, the following circumstances would be taken into account. Firstly, Article 51 CFREU states that the Charter applies when MS implement EU law. In a case such as Awoyemi, it would be difficult affirming the non-application of the CFREU, since the national law would be implementing EU law. 
Hierarchy and Compliance with EU Law and Refusal of Mutual Recognition
Berlusconi and Caronna
The Berlusconi case concerned the interaction between EU company law and the implementing Italian law, where, in compliance with EU company law, Italian law initially provided for effective (criminal) penalties. However, the law was subsequently amended by a subsequent law, which decriminalised the specified conducts to some extent. The referral for a preliminary ruling arose in the context of criminal proceedings that concerned facts dating back the first version of the Italian law. As a consequence, the alleged behaviour could have been subject (in theory) to criminal liability. On the other hand, the subsequent legal framework introduced by the newer law set a regime more favourable to the accused, but potentially less effective than the former one. Therefore, at stake here was a contrast In the next section, I argue that this case-law can be highly relevant for European criminal law, with particular regard to the possibility to refuse mutual recognition on fundamental rights grounds.
The Importance of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters
The application of mutual recognition to judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU was firstly decided at the European Council of Tampere in 1998, XLII and, as known, is a principle borrowed from internal market law. XLIII Introduced by the CJEU with the Cassis de Dijon judgment, XLIV it required that a product/economic activity, that has been lawfully produced/marketed/exercised in one MS, should be capable of being marketed into another MS without further burdens or conditions. Such a principle finds a limit in the Treaty exceptions (e.g. public policy or public health) and the mandatory requirements/justifications as elaborated by the Court of Justice. XLV Thereby, mutual recognition is mostly a sort of negative integration, which facilitates the enjoyment of Treaty rights by the free movements of products and persons under a de-regulatory logic. 
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The application of this logic to criminal law has caused a heated debate.
XLVI Indeed, in criminal matters, each instrument of mutual recognition concerns one or more kinds of judicial decisions (arrest warrant, custodial sentence, and probation measure) and abolishes the requirement of double criminality for a list of 32 offences. According to this requirement, the conduct at the basis of the judicial act at stake must constitute an offence in the jurisdictions of both the requesting and the requested states. Once that requirement has been removed, the balance in cooperation substantially changes. Indeed, when one of these judicial decisions is issued for one of the 32 conducts by MS 'A' (the issuing MS) to MS 'B' (the executing MS), the latter has to recognise and execute the decision without any further formality. For those offences not included in the list, the double criminality principle remains. However, although the executing MS does not treat that conduct as a crime in its own legal order, it may surrender the person concerned all the same, once the issuing MS has required it. The automaticity of mutual recognition in criminal matters is mitigated by mandatory and optional grounds for refusing the execution, as well as by specific rules leaving some discretion to the executing judge. I argue that the case-law discussed above (Berlusconi and Caronna) can be helpful to overcome the stalemate. Whilst concerning different situations, the rationale behind these decisions can be described as follows: the need to comply with 'higher' sources (general principles and fundamental rights) prevails over the full implementation of EU secondary law. Such a principle can be perfectly applied also to mutual recognition. Where there are serious reasons to believe that the execution e.g. of an EAW would result in a violation of a general principle, the relevant mutual recognition instrument of EU secondary law should be set aside. This would be consistent with the broader case-law of the Court, and enhance the protection of individual rights across the EU.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have tried to show how the case-law of the CJEU issued in the context of free movement can be highly relevant to European Criminal Law.
Firstly, in Skanavi and Awoyemi the Court linked the application of the principle of proportionality to entitlement to free movement. Thereby, EU citizenship comes to the fore as a requirement of the proportionality review. The consequence is that a measure can be regarded as lawful (or not) depending on whether the person concerned is a national of a MS, as such entitled to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms. The advent of the principle of proportionality of penalties under Article 49 CFREU will require clarifications in this respect. Indeed, that provision states a universal principle, and cannot be made subject to requirement of nationality. In this context, one can envisage two possible, unprecedented scenarios. If proportionality were to be applied to third-country nationals, the relationship between entitlement to free movement and the application of the principle of proportionality of penalties would be challenged. Were this not to be the case, free movement could be read as a precondition of access to fundamental rights and personal liberty.
The second way in which the case-law on free movement can be linked to European criminal law regards in particular fundamental rights and mutual recognition. In Berlusconi and Caronna, the Court seems to establish a hierarchy of levels of compliance within EU E -17 law. The full implementation of EU secondary law should be set aside, when the latter can result in a violation of fundamental rights or general principles. Such a principle can prove helpful to the highly debated possibility to refuse mutual recognition on fundamental rights grounds. Where there is a serious risk of fundamental rights infringement, the relevant legislation should give the way to EU primary law. In this light, a refusal of execution seems to be not only admitted, but also required by EU law to some extent. These scenarios discussed shows that EU law must be considered as a 'whole', and that there is great potential to heighten the standard of protection of the individual throughout the Union.
